Wednesday 24 August 2016

Warranties and Representations

It is common in share purchase agreements for the warranty clause (the first draft of which is prepared by the Buyer's solicitors) to use wording such as "The Sellers warrant, represent and undertake that…"  Whilst this may just be a case of lawyers preferring to use three words when one will do, there is often more to the use of such language than meets the eye.

A warranty is a contractual promise that something is so; e.g. that the Company does not have any liability in respect of a particular matter.  If that turns out not to have been so, the Buyer has a claim for breach of contract.  Such claims are subject to carefully-negotiated limitations of the Buyer’s liability under the share purchase agreement; typically a cap of the amount of purchase price received, a minimum threshold for claims, and a time limit for bringing claims of 1 to 3 years (or 6 or 7 years where tax is involved).

A representation is a statement of fact that induces a party to enter into a contract.  If it turns out to have been untrue, the other party may claim damages for misrepresentation.  This is a claim in tort (a legal wrong), not a claim for breach of contract, and the damages are calculated differently.  The limitations of liability in the share purchase agreement are not usually drafted to cover liability for misrepresentation.  This is why buyers’ solicitors try to include the language of representation, and sellers’ solicitors seek to delete it.  Such deletions are usually accepted without serious argument - though private equity investors' solicitors may take a tougher line, and be in a stronger negotiating position.

An undertaking is a contractual promise to do something (or not to do it).  This is completely inappropriate language for the warranties in a share purchase agreement, and is either bad drafting or a cunning attempt to hide the word "represent” amongst some apparent bad drafting.

Acting for the Seller, one therefore always seeks to avoid the language of representation, and to include the usual boilerplate "entire agreement" clause to the effect that this is the entire agreement between the parties, it supersedes all prior negotiations, and the Buyer acknowledges it is not relying on any previous representations.  This language is intended to exclude liability for misrepresentation, and with an express exception for liability for fraudulent misrepresentation is generally considered to be reasonable if negotiated at arms’ length between commercial parties with the benefit of legal advice (This is important because under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 liability for misrepresentation can only legally be excluded to the extent the exclusion is reasonable.)

In the case of Idemitsu Kosan Co Ltd v Sumitomo Corporation [2016] EWHC 1909 (Comm) (27 July 2016), Idemitsu were out of time for bringing a contractual claim for breach of warranty under a share purchase agreement (the agreed 18 month time limit for non-tax warranty claims having expired without a claim having been made), so they sought to get round this by bringing a claim for misrepresentation under s.2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967.  Sumitomo responded with an application under CPR Part 24 for summary judgment dismissing that claim, on the basis that it had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason why it should be disposed of at a trial.

Such cases always depend on the wording of the agreement, and Idemitsu were in some difficulty there, as the relevant clauses only used the language of warranties.  The word "representation" only appeared in the entire agreement clause, apparently intended to exclude them.  However there were conflicting previous cases on the point: in one Arnold J. had decided that warranties could of themselves amount to representations, and in another Mann J. had decided that they could not.  Both are eminent judges.  Idemitsu’s Counsel also ran a clever argument that by putting forward the agreement with the warranties for execution, Sumitomo had made representations inducing Idemitsu to enter into the agreement.  The target Company had interests in North Sea oil and gas fields, had been sold for US$575M, and Idemitsu was seeking to recover a claimed loss of US$105.9M (as against a contractual cap on warranty claims of US$1,5M) relating to liability for sharing the operating expenses of a floating production storage and offshore loading vessel.  So it must have seemed worth a try.

Andrew Baker QC sitting as a judge of the High Court was unconvinced by Idemitsu’s Counsel’s arguments, and preferred the reasoning of Mann J. from the previous cases.  He held that a warranty is (without further language) a contractual promise: nothing less, but nothing more.  He upheld the entire agreement clause as effective to exclude misrepresentations, of which there were none.  He therefore gave judgment for the defendant.

The case is welcome confirmation that my deletions of representation wording when acting for sellers were not in vain, and should be of comfort to sellers that their limitations on liability do mean what they thought they did.  However, given the amount at stake and the conflicting first-instance decisions, it may still go to the Court of Appeal.

Friday 19 August 2016

Can discrimination claims be an abuse of rights?

In the case of Nils-Johannes Kratzer v R+V Allgemeine Versicherung AG the Court of Justice of the European Union had to decide whether a person who was clearly not seeking employment, but merely the status of applicant in order to bring claims for compensation, was qualified to bring such claims under the EU Directives on age and sex discrimination.  Was this an abuse of rights under EU law?’

In March 2009 R+V advertised trainee positions for graduates in the fields of economics, mathematical economics, business informatics and law.  Mr Kratzer applied for a legal trainee position, emphasising that he fulfilled all the requirements in the advertisement and his experience as a lawyer and former manager with an insurance company.  When his application was rejected, Mr Kratzer responded with a written complaint demanding compensation of EUR 14,000 for age discrimination.

R+V invited Mr Kratzer to an interview with its head of HR, stating that the rejection of his application had been automatically generated and was not in line with its intentions.  But Mr Kratzer declined the invitation and suggested a discussion of his future with R+V once his compensation claim had been satisfied.

He then brought an action for the EUR 14,000 for age discrimination before the Wiesbaden Labour Court in Germany, and on finding out that R+V had awarded the four trainee posts to women only, although the 60+ applicants were divided almost equally between men and women, he increased his claim by EUR 3,500 for sex discrimination.

The Wiesbaden Labour Court dismissed the action, and the Hesse Regional Labour Court dismissed his appeal.  He appealed again to the German Federal Labour Court, which referred the above questions to the CJEU for a ruling.  The CJEU delivered its judgment on 28 July 2016 - over 7 years after the dispute first arose.

Unsurprisingly, the CJEU gave Mr Kratzer’s claims short shrift.  Dispensing with the usual Advocate General’s Opinion and looking at the underlying purpose of the Directives to ensure equal treatment of persons seeking employment, they held that “a situation in which a person who in making an application for a post does not seek to obtain that post but seeks only the formal status of applicant with the sole purpose of seeking compensation does not fall within the definition of ‘access to employment, to self-employment or to occupation’, within the meaning of those provisions, and may, if the requisite conditions under EU law are met, be considered to be an abuse of rights”.  They left the decision on costs of the case to the referring court, which one suspects is unlikely to rule in favour of Mr Kratzer if he has been abusing his rights.

Courts are never going to be sympathetic to claimants who are merely seeking compensation without having suffered a genuine loss.  Mr Kratzer’s mistake would appear to have been making payment of the compensation a precondition to the job interview.  If he was genuinely interested in the job, he should have reserved his rights and gone ahead with the application.  R+V would then have had the opportunity (if well-advised) to carry out a scrupulously fair and documented selection process for all the applicants, which could have been used in defence of his claim if he was ultimately rejected.


The case is of some comfort to companies who receive speculative discrimination claims for job applicants - though they would do well to note R+V’s careful initial response.